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HOWERTON V. ARAI HELMET, LTD
LAST DANCE WITH THE
DAUBERT-KUMHO DECISIONS:
ONE STEP FORWARD FROM TWO STEPS BACK
LISA ALUMBAUGH KAMARCHIK
I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina has often been cited for its unpopular law and mi-
nority views. For example, it is one of only four states that still main-
tain a contributory negligence doctrine.1 It recently added its voice to
the tiny chorus of states that have expressly rejected the federal stan-
dards set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The North Carolina Supreme Court
soundly rejected Daubert and its progeny in its Howerton v. Arai Hel-
met, Ltd.3 opinion, holding fast to its own earlier decision of State v.
Goode4 and finding that Goode presents a "more workable frame-
work" for ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony.
Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence is titled "Testi-
mony by Experts." Section (a) of the rule provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.5
When read on its face, Rule 702 appears quite broad. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court case, Daubert, characterized the corresponding fed-
eral rule, which is not appreciably different, as "liberal." Daubert pro-
vided flexible guidelines to help trial courts determine the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony.6 Unfortunately, cases af-
ter Daubert did not hold true to this characterization and trial courts
began to use the factors set forth in Daubert more like elements.7 As
1. Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence and Stare Decisis in
North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1996).
2. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).
4. State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2005).
6. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-588.
7. See, e.g. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
1
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argued below, this had a detrimental effect on parties seeking to bring
their causes of action before juries. Parties' expert testimony on es-
sential elements of their claims or defenses could be stricken more
easily. Stripped of their expert testimony, some parties had no causes
of action. By taking two steps back from Daubert and Kumho, North
Carolina moved one step ahead in providing parties their right to trial.
Dr. Bruce Howerton was just such a plaintiff found to be at the trial
court's mercy. This case note seeks to inform readers of the nature of
N.C. R. Evid. 702 and the underlying evidentiary principles that sur-
round it. It argues that Howerton reached the correct result based on
two grounds: (1) that earlier North Carolina cases focusing on the lib-
eral nature of Rule 702 do not comport with Daubert or its progeny;
and (2) even well-meaning law that holds great potential for abuse in
its application has no home in North Carolina.
II. THE CASE
Plaintiff, Dr. William Bruce Howerton, Jr., was "an experienced off-
road motorcycle enthusiast" who enjoyed riding off-road motorcycles
at a motocross practice track in western North Carolina.8 On October
5, 1996, Dr. Howerton was executing a routine "table top" jump at the
practice track when another rider inadvertently entered the landing
area of the jump.9 Dr. Howerton collided with the other rider; his
motorcycle was forced to an abrupt halt which launched Dr. Hower-
ton off his bike.10 Dr. Howerton landed on the back of his head in the
dirt and heard a popping or crunching sound directly before he felt
pain in his neck." He was immediately transported to the hospital by
helicopter, where it was discovered that he had suffered fractures of
his C5 and C6 cervical vertebrae.' 2 As a result of his injuries, Dr.
Howerton sustained immediate and irreparable quadriplegia. 3 On
the day of his accident, Dr. Howerton was wearing an Arai "MX/a"
helmet as well as other safety gear.' 4
Dr. Howerton subsequently brought suit against the other rider, the
owners of the practice track, and Arai Helmet, Ltd.15 Among other
claims, Dr. Howerton alleged that "Arai negligently designed, manu-
factured, and promoted a helmet that was unreasonably dangerous"
and that such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his
8. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 677.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
2
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quadriplegia. 16 The chin guard of Arai's "MX/a" helmet was flexible,
removable, and secured to the helmet by two nylon screws on each
side. 7 By contrast, most motocross helmets are designed with a rigid,
integral chin guard that is structurally molded into the helmet. Such
helmets are often called "full face" helmets.18 During Dr. Howerton's
accident, the nylon screws holding the chin guard to the helmet
sheared off at impact and the chin guard was pushed up into the visor
of the helmet, allowing Dr. Howerton's head to crunch forward. 9 Dr.
Howerton argued that a full face helmet with a rigid, integral chin
guard would have stopped his chin before it reached his chest and
would have prevented his neck from hyperflexing forward beyond its
anatomical range.2 0 Dr. Howerton and his experts contended that the
hyperflexion of his neck was responsible for the cervical fractures and
resultant paralysis.21 Arai insisted that the MX/a's chin guard was in-
tentionally designed to bend or break away on impact so as to mini-
mize dangerous torquing of the neck.2 2
Dr. Howerton proffered four experts to prove his theory of the de-
fective chin guard. Three of those experts sought to testify to the hel-
met's causal connection to the injury. Arai stipulated to Professor
Hugh H. Hurt, Jr.'s expertise in motorcycle accident reconstruction
and motorcycle helmets.23 At the time of his deposition, Professor
Hurt was President of the Head Protection Research Laboratory of
Southern California and Professor Emeritus of Safety Science at the
University of Southern California. 24 For more than twenty-five years,
Professor Hurt had researched motorcycle accidents and helmet safety
and had published comprehensive and authoritative work on those
subjects. 25 After conducting a Snell chin bar test and a hydraulic load
test designed to determine when the nylon screws on the MX/a would
fail, Professor Hurt opined that Arai's flexible chin bar and weak
screws failed to limit the flexion motion of plaintiff's neck, resulting in
Dr. Howerton's injury.26 He further opined that a rigid, integral chin
bar would have prevented the unlimited motion of Dr. Howerton's
neck and therefore, his injury.27
16. Id. at 678.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 10, Howerton v. Arai Helmet Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674
(N.C. 2004) (No. 02-0612).
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id. at 10.
2005]
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Dr. William Hutton was proffered as an expert in biomechanics and
orthopedic biomechanics.28 A colorful Scot,29 Dr. Hutton had more
than thirty-five years of experience in these fields and with spinal inju-
ries and was the Professor and Director of Orthopaedic Research at
Emory University School of Medicine.30 Dr. Hutton opined that the
flexible chin guard broke, allowing Dr. Howerton's head and neck to
move beyond their normal anatomical range of motion.3 ' Specifically,
he determined that Dr. Howerton's paralysis resulted from both
hyperflexive and compressive forces on the spine.32 He concluded
that the hyperflexion component caused bone fragments to be forced
into Dr. Howerton's spinal canal, thereby injuring his spinal cord and
causing his paralysis.33
James Randolph Hooper worked as a design engineer on off-road
helmets during the same time Arai was developing its flexible chin
guard design.34 Although not holding a college degree, "Ran"
Hooper had more than thirty years of personal experience in off-road
motorcycle riding and had built three different off-road motorcycle
helmets using his knowledge of design and manufacture of composite
materials used in helmets.35 As a member of the Helmet Industry As-
sociation, Mr. Hooper was familiar with the motorcycle helmet indus-
try and opined that it was common knowledge in the industry at the
time the MX/a helmet was designed that a rigid, integral chin bar sig-
nificantly increased the overall protection afforded by the helmet.36
He concluded that the MX/a's flexible nature created a considerable
hazard and lacked the protective features typical of full-face hel-
mets.37 Unlike the other three experts, Mr. Hooper was not testifying
on the issue of causation.
Dr. Charles Rawlings, who conducted his neurosurgery residency at
Duke University Medical Center, was a board certified neurosurgeon
with more than ten years of experience.38 Although not Dr. Hower-
ton's treating physician, Dr. Rawlings had conducted numerous spinal
surgeries on patients with cervical fractures similar to Dr. Hower-
ton's.3 9 After reviewing Dr. Howerton's medical records and radiol-
28. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 679.
29. Interview with Richard T. Rice, Dr. Howerton's attorney, Womble Carlyle Sandridge &
Rice, PLLC (Oct. 2004).
30. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 679.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 17, Howerton (No, 02-0612).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).
4
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ogy films, Dr. Rawlings concluded that Dr. Howerton had suffered a
hyperflexion-compression injury.4" He opined that Dr. Howerton did
not become paralyzed until after the moment his head rotated beyond
its normal anatomical range.41
Arai timely moved for summary judgment and moved to exclude
the expert testimony of Professor Hurt, Dr. Hutton, Ran Hooper, and
Dr. Rawlings.42 The trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibil-
ity of the experts' testimony.43 Although it declined to hear live voir
dire testimony from the experts, it considered arguments from counsel
and reviewed the discovery and pleadings of the case.4 4 The trial
court subsequently granted Arai's motion to exclude the experts' testi-
mony on the issue of causation and made findings of fact as to each of
the four proffered experts.45 Citing the earlier North Carolina case of
Goode, the trial court concluded that North Carolina had adopted
Daubert and that the experts' testimony as to causation was unreliable
and inadmissible on the basis of the federal standard set forth in
Daubert.4 6 Since Dr. Howerton was then without any evidence to
prove causation, the trial court determined that Dr. Howerton was
unable to establish a prima facie claim that his injuries were caused by
Arai's defectively designed MX/a helmet.47 A fortiori, the trial court
granted Arai's motion for summary judgment.48
Dr. Howerton appealed his case on the grounds that the trial court
erroneously relied on Daubert to exclude his expert testimony of cau-
sation.49 The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Dr. Hower-
ton's assignments of error and affirmed the order of the trial court in
its entirety.5" Specifically, the Court of Appeals ruled that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had expressly adopted Daubert three years
prior in its Goode and Bates decisions.51 The Court of Appeals went
on to evaluate the testimony of Dr. Howerton's four experts using the
Daubert criteria and held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in excluding the testimony.52
40. Id.
41. Id. at 681.
42. Id. at 679.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 679-680.
46. Id. at 683.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 684.
50. Id.
51. State v. Bates, 538 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (asserting without discussion that
Goode had adopted Daubert).
52. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 684.
2005]
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Dr. Howerton subsequently petitioned the North Carolina Supreme
Court for discretionary review, which was granted.53 One of the issues
it agreed to address was whether North Carolina had, in fact, adopted
Daubert as the test by which to assess the admissibility of expert testi-
mony.54 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the holding of
the Court of Appeals and vacated the decision of the trial court.55
Emphasizing the fundamental distinction between the admissibility of
evidence (as determined by the judge) and its weight (to be given by a
jury), the Court remanded the case for an evaluation of the experts'
testimony based on the 3-part inquiry outlined in Goode.56
III. BACKGROUND
Because this case involves the application of Rule 702 of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence, and because North Carolina modeled its
Rule 702 after the federal rule, it is helpful to discuss the federal and
state approaches to the admissibility of expert testimony to under-
stand the backdrop against which Howerton was decided.
The federal approach to admissibility of expert testimony is largely
guided by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.57 Prior to deciding Daubert, the federal courts had
relied on the 1923 decision of Frye v. United States. 58 Frye held that
scientific expert testimony was admissible only when it was based on
sufficiently established principles that had gained general acceptance
in the particular field to which it belonged. 59 This came to be known
as the "general acceptance" test.6" In 1975, Congress enacted Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.61 Rule 702 and Frye coexisted peacefully until
1993 when Daubert reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Daubert, the parents of two children born with serious birth de-
fects sued a major pharmaceutical company, alleging that the mother's
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 694.
56. Id. at 686-687.
57. Expert testimony is also guided by the interplay of FED. R. EVID. 403 and FED. R. EvIo.
703, as well as established case law interpreting and applying those rules.
58. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (expert testimony in murder case
regarding the systolic blood pressure deception test was properly excluded at trial because the
test had not gained the required standing and scientific recognition from psychological and phys-
iological authorities).
59. Id.
60. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 685.
61. The original FED. R. EvID. 702 read, "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
6
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ingestion of an antinausea drug caused the birth defects.62 Based on
animal studies, chemical structure analyses, meta-analyses, and litera-
ture review, the parents' well-credentialed expert concluded that the
antinausea drug caused birth defects.63 The pharmaceutical company
provided its own expert who concluded otherwise and the trial court
excluded the plaintiff's expert testimony, finding that the bases on
which the plaintiff's expert relied did not meet the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" standard. 64 The appellate court affirmed. 65 After granting
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the lower
courts and remanded the case, holding that the techniques upon which
an expert bases his opinions do not have to be "generally accepted" to
be reliable.66 In addition to recognizing the potential shortsightedness
of applying Frye to novel areas of scientific inquiry, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Daubert that Fed. R. Evid. 702 superseded Frye.6 7
The Daubert court sought to provide some flexible guidelines for
lower courts to follow in the future when determining the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony.68 Before launching into its flexible factors
that would comport more readily with the liberal intent of Fed. R.
Evid. 702, the Daubert court cautioned, "[m]any factors will bear on
the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or
test."'69 The factors listed were: (1) whether the scientific theory or
technique upon which the expert's opinion is based can be or has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique employed by the expert
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of the scientific technique; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and
(5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted within its
relevant scientific community.7 ° The Court labeled this preliminary
assessment by the trial court as the judge's "gatekeeping role. ' 71 The
dissent predicted that forcing federal judges to don the hats of ama-
teur scientists would result in a lot of conflicting law.72
Subsequent cases have hemmed in the foundations laid by Daubert.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael extended the effect of Daubert beyond
62. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
63. Id. at 583.
64. Id. at 583.
65. Id. at 584.
66. Id. at 589, 598.
67. Id. at 589.
68. Id. at 593-594.
69. Id. at 593.
70. Id. at 593-594.
71. Id. at 597.
72. Id. at 600 - 601.
2005]
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scientific expert testimony73 by holding that any spccialized testimony
offered under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may be put through the flexible fac-
tors analysis. 74 However, a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia sug-
gested that it might be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to
apply one of the Daubert factors.75 Moreover, in Weisgram v. Marley
Co. the U.S. Supreme Court took the position that an appellate court
may reverse or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when a
trial court incorrectly admits expert testimony under Daubert.76
Daubert and its progeny have since prompted the revision of Fed.
R. Evid. 702. In 2000, the rule was amended to state, additionally,
that experts may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise, if: "(1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case." 77 Although this appears to be the state of the law in the federal
arena at the present time, 78 North Carolina has taken a different route
in establishing the application of its now-less-similar Rule 702.
Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence was promulgated
in 1983. 7 9 At the time, it was almost indistinguishable from its federal
counterpart, omitting only the words "or otherwise" at the end of the
rule. This rule was also identical to an earlier North Carolina statute,
which was repealed when the rule became effective. 0 Rule 702 of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence is titled "Testimony by Experts."
Section (a) of the rule provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.
Prior to Rule 702, North Carolina appears to have been friendly to
expert testimony, even when the field of expertise was in its "in-
fancy."81 2 The state has liberally interpreted who can be an expert,
what it takes to qualify as an expert, and what are proper subjects
73. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 159.
76. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
77. FED. R. EVID. 702.
78. The Seventh Circuit recently decided in United States v. Parra, 402 F3d 752 (7th Cir.
2005), that the 2000 amendments to FED. R. EVID. 702 which were prompted by Daubert now
supersede Daubert.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2005).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.13, derived from Laws 1981, c. 53, §§ 1 to 3.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702. The subsequent subsections of Rule 702 specifically
address medical malpractice cases and are therefore beyond the scope of this case note.
82. See e.g., State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951) (allowing expert analysis of bare
footprints); State v. Crowder, 203 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1974) (allowing expert analysis of gunshot
8
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about which an expert may testify.83 North Carolina has never ad-
hered to the view that expert testimony must be based exclusively on
generally accepted methods, i.e., the Frye test.84 On the contrary, it is
enough that the expert witness "because of his expertise is in a better
position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact."85
True to the language of the rule, it is enough that the testimony can
assist the trier of fact because the witness has helpful knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education which the jurors do not.86 As to
what subjects are proper for expert testimony, the guiding principle is
helpfulness - whether the particular issue in the case is one on which
the expert can be helpful to jurors. 87
After North Carolina enacted Rule 702, one of its first opportuni-
ties to address the admissibility of expert testimony came in State v.
Bullard.18 The defendant, Mr. Bullard, was accused of murdering Pe-
dro Hales and dumping his body in the South River.89 The case
against Mr. Bullard was largely circumstantial, and the North Carolina
Supreme Court's inquiry was centered on whether to admit Dr. Lou-
ise Robbins' expert testimony relating to the identification of the per-
petrator through the bloody footprints found in the sand near the
bridge over South River.90 Dr. Robbins was a physical anthropologist
employed at the University of North Carolina in Greensboro. 91 Dur-
ing a lengthy voir dire hearing she testified as to her background,
qualifications, and independent studies in bare footprint compari-
sons.92 She explained her methodology and conceded that she was the
only person in the country to attempt to identify footprints based on
four particular measurements taken of foot impressions, citing only
two other experts in England and Germany who routinely engaged in
the same kind of footprint analysis.93 Dr. Robbins opined, based on
her measurements and experience, the bloody footprints in the sand
belonged to Mr. Bullard. 94 The trial court admitted the testimony of
Dr. Robbins, and Mr. Bullard was subsequently sentenced to life im-
residue test utilizing flameless atomic absorption spectrophotometry); State v. Temple, 273
S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1981) (allowing expert analysis of bite mark identification).
83. See generally, 2-7 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRNIIS AND BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §§ 184-185 (6th ed. 2005).
84. State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984).
85. State v. Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (N.C. 1978).
86. 1d.
87. Broun, supra note 83.
88. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 370.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 374.
91. Id. at 373.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 374.
94. Id. at 373.
2005]
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prisonment.95 The North Carolina Supreme Court heard Mr. Bul-
lard's appeal and decided that the trial court did not err in allowing
Dr. Robbins to testify to the novel scientific theory embodied in her
opinions.96 It determined that based on its reasoning in other cases
involving novel scientific theories, Dr. Robbins' methodology was reli-
able.97 The Court noted that, contrary to the defendant's assertion
that North Carolina had adopted the Frye general acceptance test,
North Carolina had not.9" Although finding that general acceptance
was certainly a factor to be examined in deciding whether to admit
expert testimony, North Carolina did not adhere exclusively to the
Frye formula. 99
In State v. Pennington, a subsequent case involving the admissibility
of an expert's DNA analysis to implicate the accused, the Court fur-
ther expounded on the Bullard court's analysis:
Believing that the inquiry underlying the Frye formula is one of the
reliability of the scientific method rather than its popularity within a
scientific community, we have focused on the following indices of reli-
ability: the expert's use of established techniques, the expert's profes-
sional background in the field, the use of visual aids before the jury so
that the jury is not asked "to sacrifice its independence by accepting
the scientific hypotheses on faith," and independent research con-
ducted by the expert.100
The Pennington court cited other state courts' analyses that unless the
evidence is so tainted that it is "totally unreliable," it should be al-
lowed.10 1 Opponents of expert testimony were encouraged to use
traditional challenges against the evidence, such as relevancy,
prejudice, chain of custody, or contamination. 10 2 The court suggested
that such issues should go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.10 3
Five years later in State v. Goode, the Court was called upon to
assess the reliability of a proffered expert's testimony regarding
bloodstain pattern interpretation.1 0 4 The court first cited Daubert for
the proposition that addressing the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony required "a preliminary assessment of whether the reason-
ing or methodology underlying the testimony [was] sufficiently valid
95. Id.
96. Id. at 385.
97. Id. at 384.
98. Id. at 380.
99. Id.
100. State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852-853 (N.C. 1990).
101. Id. at 854.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).
10
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and whether [such] reasoning or methodology can be properly applied
to the facts in issue. ' 10 5 The court cited both Bullard and Pennington
and specifically analyzed the same four criteria applied in Bullard and
outlined in Pennington, and not the five flexible factors of Daubert. 106
It analyzed the expert's use of established techniques, his professional
background in the field under inquiry, his independent research, and
whether he used visual aids to assist jurors in making their own deter-
minations rather than merely asking the jury to accept his hypothesis
on faith.10
7
The court first concluded that the technique of bloodstain pattern
interpretation was a subject matter appropriate for expert testimony;
the court had already impliedly accepted bloodstain pattern interpre-
tation as a scientific method of proof and deemed it to be therefore
reliable.1" 8 The court next found that the expert was qualified by vir-
tue of his education and experience in that field. 109 Third, it found the
expert's testimony relevant because he had reviewed the case evi-
dence and applied it accordingly. Overall, the Goode court seemed to
establish its own criteria."n It reiterated the distinction between ad-
mission of testimony and the weight it is to be accorded by the jury..1
and decided the defendant's assignment of error was without merit,
particularly because he had been afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine the expert and had even elicited favorable information from
that expert.1 12 This appeared to be the state of the law in North Caro-
lina at the time Dr. Howerton's experts were excluded by the trial
court.
IV. ANALYSIS
Arai's argument for excluding Dr. Howerton's experts rested
squarely on its implied assertion that North Carolina had adopted
Daubert as the controlling analysis for determining admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. 3 Arai argued that Dr. Howerton's four experts: (1)
had not performed testing relevant to the causation issues of the case;
(2) had not undertaken independent research to support their hypoth-
eses; (3) had not subjected their hypotheses to peer review; (4) had
not published their hypotheses; (5) had relied on inadequate and non-
105. Id. at 639.
106. Id. at 639-640.
107. Id. at 640.
108. Id. at 641, citing State v. Daughtry, 459 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1995); State v. Willis, 426
S.E.2d 471 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
109. Id. at 642.
110. Id. at 643 - 644.
111. Id. at 645.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. 2004).
2005]
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existent data to form their opinions which necessarily meant the opin-
ions were subject to a high rate of error; and (6) had not demonstrated
that their opinions were generally accepted within their own fields.114
These attacks made by Arai almost exactly follow the multiple, "flexi-
ble" criteria established by Daubert.
In response, Dr. Howerton argued that Daubert had been neither
impliedly nor expressly adopted by North Carolina and that his ex-
perts' testimony was admissible under general North Carolina eviden-
tiary principles, including Goode.115 Dr. Howerton further argued
that even if Daubert were the law of North Carolina, his experts' testi-
mony would still be admissible if the flexible multi-factored test was
applied to each one.116
The North Carolina Supreme Court rightly rejected Daubert and its
progeny on two grounds. First, contrary to the lower courts' asser-
tions, the court found that Daubert and its related cases did not com-
port with North Carolina's earlier line of cases with respect to expert
testimony.117 Second, the court recognized the potential for abuse
when applying Daubert and its progeny to the detriment of parties'
claims or defenses."18
After reviewing earlier case law, the court agreed with Dr. Hower-
ton's position that Goode was controlling and had set forth a three-
step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1)
whether the expert's method of proof was sufficiently reliable as an
area for expert testimony; (2) whether the witness qualified as an ex-
pert in that area of testimony; and (3) whether the expert's testimony
was relevant."l 9
The court correctly noted that Goode's first requirement of reliabil-
ity was "nothing new" and pre-dated the federal courts' adoption of
114. Id.
115. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 25-28, Howerton v. Arai Helmet Ltd., 597 S.E. 2d 674
(N.C. 2004) (No. 02-0612).
116. Id. at 37-40.
117. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 689 ("Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, it is
not 'eminently clear' that North Carolina adopted the Daubert standard. Such a bold proposi-
tion is neither confirmed by the case law of this Court nor buttressed by the 'express holding' of
the lower court in State v. Bates (citation omitted), which was nothing more than a passing cita-
tion parenthetical suggesting without more analysis or discussion that this Court had adopted
Daubert in the Goode opinion.").
118. See id. at 692 ("In such instances, we are concerned that trial courts asserting sweeping
pre-trial 'gatekeeping' authority under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitu-
tionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the weight of the
evidence.").
119. Id. at 686.
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the Daubert analysis.1 ° In assessing reliability, the court cited its lib-
eral approach in earlier cases' 21 and cautioned:
This assessment does not, however, go so far as to require the expert's
testimony to be proven conclusively reliable or indisputably valid
before it can be admitted into evidence. In this regard, we emphasize
the fundamental distinction between the admissibility of evidence and
its weight, the latter of which is a matter traditionally reserved for the
jury.
The court did not purport to analyze Dr. Howerton's experts and ad-
mit their testimony. 23 It instead vacated the trial court's findings.12 4
However, the cautionary conclusion reached by the court on this
count proved correct. Professor Hurt expected to testify to motorcy-
cle accident reconstruction analysis, Dr. Hutton to the biomechanics
of the human spine, and Dr. Rawlings to his medical opinions as to the
cause and effects of an injury. As the plaintiff's brief to the Court
120. Id.
121. Id. at 687. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 2002) (recognizing the ad-
missibility of DNA evidence and upholding its use as the basis of an opinion by a properly
qualified expert in forensic DNA analysis), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1125 (2003); State v. Goode,
461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995) (reliability of bloodstain pattern interpretation supported in part by
prior appellate acceptance of such technique in North Carolina and other jurisdictions); State v.
Barnes, 430 S.E.2d 223, 231 (N.C. 1993) (recognizing the long established admissibility of results
of blood group testing for identification purposes), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 946 (1993); State v.
Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990) (finding persuasive authority in other jurisdictions' ac-
ceptance of DNA profiling); State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572, 578 (N.C. 1951) (recognizing that
fingerprint evidence is an established and reliable method of identification) overruled on other
grounds by State v. Silver, 213 S.E.2d 247 (1975). Conversely, the court noted that other fields of
inquiry were inherently unreliable. See e.g., State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883, 890 (N.C. 1992) (con-
cluding that 'evidence that a prosecuting witness is suffering from post-traumatic stress syn-
drome should not be admitted for the substantive purpose of proving that a rape has in fact
occurred' because of the unreliability of underlying psychiatric procedures used to diagnose the
condition); State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 188 (N.C. 1984) (holding that 'hypnosis has not
reached a level of scientific acceptance which justifies its use for courtroom purposes'); State v.
Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (N.C. 1983) (holding that polygraphs are inadmissible in any trial,
even if otherwise stipulated to by the parties).
122. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 687, citing Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 11 S.E.2d 341, 343
(N.C. 1940).
123. However, with respect to Dr. Howerton's unfair trade practices claim, Justice Wain-
wright observed that "it is not the function of this Court, or the trial court for that matter, to
weigh conflicting evidence of record. Rather, in cases such as this, when there are genuine issues
of material fact that are legitimately called into question, summary judgment should be denied
and the issue preserved for the jury." Id. at 694. Justice Wainwright further stated that "the
record reveals deposition testimony by Professor Hurt that clearly supports Howerton's claim
that Arai's flexible chin bar was inadequately designed . I..." d. He thus concluded that a
legitimate conflict of evidence raised by Professor Hurt's deposition testimony created a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. On remand, it was improbable that a trial court would be comfortable
reanalyzing and re-striking Dr. Howerton's experts on the issue of causation in light of Justice
Wainwright's implied instruction that the unfair trade practices claim must go to the jury. The
same evidence of causation would be needed by Dr. Howerton to support his unfair trade prac-
tices claim.
124. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 694.
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noted,125 each of these areas is recognized by North Carolina law as
an appropriate field for expert testimony as required by Goode.
12 6
Moreover, the expert testimony of Ran Hooper was intended not to
prove causation, but to give weight to plaintiff's other arguments of
negligent design and unfair and deceptive trade practices.127
In assessing the second criterion of Goode, the Court again focused
on the liberal definition of who may qualify as an expert:
As pertains to the sufficiency of an expert's qualifications, we discern
no qualitative difference between credentials based on formal, aca-
demic training and those acquired through practical experience. In
either instance, the trial court must be satisfied that the expert pos-
sesses "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge [that] will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.' 128
The Howerton court cited Goode again: "[i]t is enough that the expert
witness 'because of his expertise is in a better position to have an
opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.' ,129 Given the educa-
tion, experience, and other qualifications of Professor Hurt, Dr. Hut-
ton, Randolph Hooper, and Dr. Rawlings, the trial court apparently
agreed that these parties were "in a better position to have an opinion
on the subject" than the jury because the case subsequently went to
trial in October of 2004 and these experts were allowed to testify. 3 °
Further, neither the Court of Appeals nor Arai had objected to the
qualifications of Professor Hurt, Dr. Hutton or Dr. Rawlings. 1 3 1
The last Goode criterion called for relevance. The relevance stan-
dard is a low threshold set by Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence as reigned in by Rule 403. Rule 403 states that evidence
which is substantially more prejudicial than probative may be ex-
cluded. 3 2 Evidence is relevant simply if it has any tendency to make
the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it would be
125. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 34, Howerton, (No. 02-0612).
126. See Zarek v. Stine, No. 01-0033, slip op. at 10 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2002) (unpublished
opinion admitting accident reconstruction expert); Floyd v. McGill, 575 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003) (permitting biomechanics expert testimony); see also Cherry v. Harrell, 353 S.E.2d
433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (permitting medical expert testimony as to causation).
127. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 35, Howerton, (No. 02-0612).
128. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 688.
129. Id. at 461, citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2005).
130. Interview with Richard T. Rice, Dr. Howerton's attorney, Womble Carlyle Sandridge &
Rice, PLLC (Oct. 2004). The trial lasted four weeks, and the jurors deliberated for almost four
days before declaring to the judge an informal impasse with a 6-6 split. When the judge in-
structed the jurors to continue their deliberations, the parties succeeded in settling the case for
an undisclosed amount - no doubt strongly motivated by the prospective costs associated with
having to retry the case.
131. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 35, Howerton, (No. 02-0612).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules 401 and 403 (2005).
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without the evidence. 3 3 Whether Professor Hurt could reconstruct
how the helmet broke, whether Dr. Hutton could testify about how
biomechanical forces could cause Dr. Howerton's neck to fracture, or
whether Dr. Rawlings could testify as to how cervical fractures can
result in quadriplegia are all certainly relevant to Dr. Howerton's
case. They were so relevant, in fact, that without them, the trial court
determined that Dr. Howerton would have no case. The trial court
recognized this on remand and the case proceeded to trial.
The second reason the court rejected Daubert and its progeny was
because it correctly recognized the easy potential for abuse by parties
arguing, and trial courts applying, Daubert with Kumho. Not only are
the Daubert-Kumho decisions not in keeping with North Carolina evi-
dence law, the Howerton court noted that the Daubert-Kumho deci-
sions have received heavy criticism by many courts for their potential
for abuse in excluding otherwise admissible expert testimony. 134 Al-
though originally intended to convey the liberal thrust of Rule 702 in
determining the admissibility of such testimony, Daubert and its prog-
eny have been cited as grounds for barring plaintiffs' experts in civil
cases, ultimately causing plaintiffs to be unable to present essential
elements of their claims. As the Howerton court stated:
When the United States Supreme Court jettisoned the "rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement of Frye, it did so in order to further the 'lib-
eral thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of re-
laxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."' (Citations to
Daubert omitted). We believe that in practice, however, application of
the "flexible" Daubert standard has been anything but liberal or re-
laxed and that trial courts, such as the one in the present case, have
often been reluctant to stray far from the original Daubert factors in
their analysis of the reliability of expert testimony.' 35
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 401.
134. Howerton, 297 S.E.2d at 691. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Court-
house: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation
Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341 (1999); see also State v. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d 800, 812-14
(Minn. 2000) (rejecting Daubert on grounds that, among other things, Daubert has not achieved
its stated intention of relaxing the barriers to the admissibility of expert testimony); 2 Michael H.
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 702.5, at 461-62 (5th ed. 2001) ("Daubert is a very
incomplete case if not a very bad decision. It did not, in any way, accomplish what it was meant
to, i.e., encourage more liberal admissibility of expert witness evidence. In fact, Daubert overall
in practice actually created a more stringent test for expert evidence admissibility especially in
civil cases."); David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme
Court's Philosophy of Science, 68 Mo. L. REV. 1, 40 (2003) ("As often happens, a premature
pronouncement that was intended to be flexible has become an established set of criteria. It was
foolhardy for the Court to ignore what was going to happen, which was that trial judges would
consider the four Daubert factors to be legal principles established by the Supreme Court."
(footnotes omitted)).
135. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 691 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588).
20051
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By applying the Daubert factors as a checklist for admission of expert
testimony, contrary to Daubert's express charge not to do so, trial
judges could easily dispense with otherwise admissible evidence. The
Kumho concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, suggesting that a trial
court could abuse its discretion if it failed to apply one of the Daubert
factors, further prompted trial courts to apply the factors as a check-
list.136 In the absence of expert testimony to support a plaintiff's case,
trial judges could essentially force a plaintiff to take a voluntary dis-
missal or settle out of court for a nominal sum.
The Court made another disquieting observation. Unlike motions
for summary judgment, preliminary motions to exclude expert testi-
mony are resolved under Rule of Evidence 104(a). Rule 104(a) does
not contain the procedural safeguards of, for example, requiring the
trial court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant:
Taking advantage of these procedural differences, a party may use a
Daubert hearing to exclude an opponent's expert testimony on an es-
sential element of the cause of action. With no other means of prov-
ing that element of the claim, the non-moving party would inevitably
perish in the ensuing motion for summary judgment. By contrast, a
party who directly moves for summary judgment without a prelimi-
nary Daubert determination will not likely fare as well because of the
inherent procedural safeguards favoring the non-moving party in mo-
tions for summary judgment. 137
Most disturbing of all, as the Howerton court noted when it cited
one federal trial judge,138 trial judges applying Daubert in a heavy-
handed manner could lighten their own caseloads considerably. How-
erton destroyed those conflicts of interest inherent in the Daubert-
driven judicial system.
V. CONCLUSION
North Carolina recently joined a minority of states in expressly re-
fusing to apply the Daubert-Kumho factors for judging the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony. The North Carolina Supreme Court soundly
rejected Daubert and its progeny in Howerton v. Arai, holding that the
3-part inquiry established in its own earlier case of Goode presented a
"more workable framework" for ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony.
136. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 159.
137. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 692.
138. Id. at 691 (quoting Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F.Supp. 2d. 1291 (D. Ala.
2001)).
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By expressly clinging to its earlier inquiry established in Goode,
North Carolina ensured that trial judges would not apply the Daubert
factors so rigidly as to oust cases with merit from the courtroom.
Howerton rightly emphasized the distinction between the admissibility
of expert testimony and the weight it should be accorded by the jury.
Howerton represents a further assurance to those who are wronged
that they will have their deserved "day in court." By taking two steps
back from Daubert and Kumho, North Carolina moved one step
ahead in providing parties their right to trial.
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